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Abstract
This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire
by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make
firms in a competitive labor market act as monopsonists, lead workers
with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different
wages, may alleviate the hold-up problem in firm-specific investment,
can make it profitable for an employer to give workers autonomy in
effort or task choice, and can propagate shocks to unemployment.
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1 Introduction
People enjoy having impact. Psychologists consider the impact incentive as
a major one (McClelland (1987), chapter 4). Having impact on the world
gives people pleasure as it makes them feel strong and excited (McClelland
et al. (1985), and Schultheiss et al. (2004)). The impact incentive appears
early in life. McClelland (1987, p. 148) quotes Levy (1955) about the ‘battle
of the spoon’:
“...the moment when the baby grabs the spoon from the mother’s
hand and tries to feed itself. ... We can be sure that the child
is not motivated at this point by increased oral gratification. He
gets more food by letting mother do it, but by doing it himself he
gets more of another kind of satisfaction–a feeling of efficacy.”
In older babies, the desire for impact can result in annoying and even dan-
gerous behavior, like making loud noises, knocking things about, or pulling
things off tables. Out of the impact experiences in early childhood, and the
gratification that it brings, develops what McClelland (1987) describes as
the ‘power motive:’ a recurrent concern for having impact on others or the
world at large (see also Winter, 1973). The desire for impact also relates to
de Charms (1968)’s notion of ‘personal causation’ and to Deci (1975)’s con-
cept of self-determination. According to de Charms (1968, p. 269), “Man’s
primary motivational propensity is to be effective in producing change in his
environment.” The impact motive also appears in the wonderful story Tom
Wolfe reports in The Right Stuff about astronauts who demanded manual
controls on a spacecraft, rather than allowing automatic controls to control
the flight.
This paper explores the meaning and implications of a person’s desire
for impact. The meaning is not obvious. Taking a particular action x may
well be considered as having the same impact as avoiding action x. We shall
address this paradox. Our study focuses on how the impact motive affects
behavior in the labor market. We will show that people’s desire for impact
can parsimoniously explain a wide range of phenomena observed in labor
markets.
Employers deem the impact motive as important. Job ads sometimes
mention “desire to make an impact” as a qualification of the ideal candidate.
For instance, the accounting firm Deloitte UK states on its recruitment web-
site that one of the characteristics that their consultants have in common
1
is “a desire to make an impact and create change.”1 Trader Joe’s Grocery
Stores tries to recruit store workers by offering the chance to “make an im-
pact on people, product, and sales. We’re talking about a chance to make a
difference, not just be another cog in the wheel.”2 Perry (2001, p. 28) quotes
a director of Xerox’s research center as saying that: “Our top stars say they
want to make an impact–that’s the most important thing. Feeling they are
contributing and making a difference is highly motivational for them.” Sim-
ilarly, a director of human resources of technology company Corning says:
“People come to work here because they want to do world-changing things.
If for some reason they think they can’t do that, they may look elsewhere.”
A report by the British Treasury (Foster et al., (2002), p. 6) quotes a senior
manager of a University Hospital as saying that: “...being able to have a real
impact on how the patients are treated is key. There are quite phenomenal
returns in terms of motivation.” In the same report (p. 11), a manager of
Stockton Council says: “It is about the public service, but it is also about
having the opportunity to make a difference ... It is more than wanting to
do good. It is about knowing that you actually do make a real difference.”
Our assumption that a worker cares about his impact relates to the as-
sumption that a worker values the output he produces. The two differ, how-
ever, because a person can also make a difference by producing less than
someone else would. Several recent papers study workers who care about
output, either for altruistic reasons (Francois (2000, 2004), and Prendergast
(2003)) or because they intrinsically value their contribution to the produc-
tion of public services (Besley and Ghatak (2004), Delfgaauw and Dur (2002),
and Glazer (2004)).
An extensive literature in psychology, both theoretical and empirical,
stresses the importance of the impact motive for workers’ behavior. Hackman
and Oldham (1976) identify task significance (that is, the degree to which
the task is seen as important and having impact) as one of the five core job
dimensions promoting performance quality and job satisfaction. Relatedly,
in Thomas and Velthouse (1990)’s concept of ‘worker empowerment,’ sense
of impact is one of the four core dimensions fostering intrinsic task motiva-
tion (see also Conger and Kanungo, 1988). Spreitzer and Doneson (2005)
review extensive empirical evidence showing that employees are higher per-
forming and have more positive attitudes in terms of work satisfaction when
1http://graduates.deloitte.co.uk/index.cfm?p_id=242
2http://company.monster.com/trader/
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given more power. Relatedly, much evidence indicates that people intrinsi-
cally value freedom of choice beyond the mere opportunity to match personal
preferences with available alternatives (see, for example, Deci (1975), Perl-
mutter and Monty (1977), and Zuckerman et al. (1978)).3
Economists have also found evidence consistent with the idea that im-
pact matters to workers. In a recent survey among US nonprofit workers,
61% say that the chance to make a difference is more important to them
than the salary and benefits (Light (2002)). Clark (1998), relying on a sur-
vey of seven thousand workers in OECD countries, reports that 33.6% of
respondents consider it very important to have a job that “allows [a person]
to work independently.” In contrast only 11.9% consider it very important
that the job “leaves a lot of leisure time” and 24.1% consider “high income”
to be very important. In a more direct study of the relation between impact
and wages, Handel (2000) examined 1,311 responses to the Quality of Em-
ployment Survey of 1977. He finds that 18.1% of respondents were willing
to trade a 10 percent pay raise in return for “more freedom to decide how to
work.” Benz and Frey (2003) examine why, though employees earn more than
the self-employed, self-employed workers are happier than employed workers.
Using survey data from 23 countries, they find that the greater autonomy
of self-employed people fully explains the positive job satisfaction differen-
tial between self-employed and employed people (see also Frey and Benz
(2003)). Frey and Kucher (1999), using survey data on Swiss managers, find
that having more subordinates does not significantly increase the wage after
controlling for manager’s education and tenure. They interpret this finding
as evidence that people are willing to pay for power. Frey et al. (2001)
study earnings of Swiss public employees in 1996, and find that earnings
of higher-ranked public employees are higher in cantons having more direct
democracy, indicating a compensating wage differential for less discretionary
leeway. Smith, Masi, and Lemay (1997) find evidence for the impact motive
from market data: the greater a worker’s autonomy in decision making, the
lower his pay.4
3Freedom of choice may, however, also cause a psychological burden, in particular when
choices are complex, or when people must choose among unwanted outcomes. See Botti
and Iyengar (2004), and the papers discussed therein.
4We note, however, that the evidence on how a worker’s wage varies with how closely
he is supervised is mixed. (See, for example, Leonard (1987), Groshen and Krueger (1990),
Krueger (1991), and Brunello (1995)). While the desire by workers for impact implies a
positive relation between wages and supervision, standard efficiency wage theory suggests
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In the following, we shall suppose that a person’s utility increases with
his income and with his impact. As noted above, identifying impact can be
problematic: if action x increases output, then not taking action x reduces
output, and so taking action x and avoiding action x may be seen as hav-
ing the same impact. We address this paradox by supposing that a person
measures the impact of any action he may take by comparing output in the
current period to what it would have been had he unexpectedly ceased to
exist an instant before. Thus, we define a person’s impact as the difference
that his existence makes to output. Note that impact can arise both because
a person increases output, and because he reduces it. We allow for both.
2 Monopsony-like behavior
For our first application, consider a firm producing goods using capital (K)
and labor (L) as inputs. For simplicity, let effort by each worker be exoge-
nously given, so that L represents the number of workers hired. Output is
Q = f(K,L), with fL > 0 and fK > 0. Suppose, as is conventional, that
fLL < 0 and fKK < 0, or that the marginal product of labor declines with
the number of workers the firm hires, and similarly for capital. Output is
sold at price p; the rental rate of capital is r.
A person’s utility, U(w, I), increases with his income w and with his im-
pact I. We assume that a worker’s outside option is unemployment. An
unemployed person gets an unemployment benefit b, and engages in house-
hold production with monetary value q, implying income w = b + q. (We
could instead assume that the worker’s outside option is self-employment,
resulting in production value q, and b = 0).
Following our definition of impact, when a worker chooses the outside
option, his impact is q, since output declines by q when the worker ceases
to exist. A worker’s impact when working for a firm depends on the ease
with which the firm can replace a worker. If a worker cannot be replaced,
and the capital stock is fixed, then his impact equals the value of his mar-
ginal product pfL(K,L). If a worker can be replaced immediately by an
unemployed person, then the firm’s output remains the same when a worker
vanishes. Aggregate output in the economy, however, falls by q, since the
a negative relation between wages and supervision. (See, however, Walsh (1999), who
shows that the sign of the efficiency-wage effect depends on the shape of the worker’s
effort supply curve.)
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worker’s substitute no longer engages in household production. Hence, when
a worker can be replaced immediately, an employed person’s impact equals
an unemployed person’s impact, q. More generally, suppose that with prob-
ability φ a firm can immediately replace a worker. Assume that, because of
search frictions in the labor market, φ < 1.5 An employed worker’s impact
is then
I(K,L) = (1− φ) pfL(K,L) + φq, (1)
with first derivatives:
IK = (1− φ) pfLK ≥ 0,
IL = (1− φ) pfLL < 0.
When the firm hires more labor, the marginal product of labor declines, and
so each worker’s impact, I, declines. Unless capital and labor are perfect
substitutes (fLK = 0), an increase in the capital stock increases each worker’s
impact.
When hiring labor, the firm must satisfy a worker’s participation con-
straint, U [w, I(K,L)] > U (w, q). When the participation constraint binds,
it follows that
wL ≡
∂w
∂L
= −ILUI
Uw
> 0,
wK ≡
∂w
∂K
= −IKUI
Uw
≤ 0.
Hence, a firm which hires additional labor will find that each worker’s utility
from impact declines, so that it must compensate with a higher wage. When
the firm installs more capital, and fLK > 0, each worker’s impact increases,
and so the firm can offer a lower wage.6
The firm chooses K, L, and w to maximize profits, pf(K,L)− rK −wL,
subject to U [w, I(K,L)] > U (w, q). The first-order condition for optimal
5Using data from a survey of 800 managers in 12 industries in the United States,
Nicholson et al. (2004) find that only 22% of the workers are easy to replace with a worker
of similar quality or productivity. A 3-day absence has no effect on output for only 29%
of workers, whereas a 2-week absence affects output for all but 15% of the workers.
6This does not necessarily imply that more capital-intensive firms pay lower wages.
Indeed, in empirical work Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Hellerstein and
Neumark (1999) find the opposite. Depending on the exact properties of the production
function, more capital-intensive firms may pay higher or lower wages in the optimum.
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employment is:
pfL(K,L)− w − wLL = 0. (2)
Since wL > 0, the firm will hire less labor than at the point where the wage
equals the marginal product of labor. For by hiring more labor, it increases
the wage it must pay. Thus, the desire by workers for impact has implications
similar to monopsony.
A standard result in the monopsony literature, is that when firms have
monopsony power over heterogeneous workers, the imposition of a minimum
wage can increase employment. That result also holds in our model. This
relates to the finding by Card and Krueger (1994) that an increase in the
minimum wage in New Jersey in 1992 did not reduce employment in fast-
food restaurants. One explanation offered was monopsony. But it is unclear
why fast-food restaurants in New Jersey enjoyed any monopsony power. As
is clear from the above results, a minimum wage may increase employment
even when workers are identical and firms lack monopsony power. All that is
necessary is that workers value impact, and cannot be replaced immediately
when they quit the firm or vanish.
Another immediate implication of our model is that the impact motive
may lead workers with the same characteristics but at firms with different
production technologies to earn different wages. When workers do not care
about impact, the wage w simply equals the reservation wage w, and is
thus independent of the characteristics of the industry or of the firm. When
workers do care about impact, the wage depends on worker’s impact in the
optimum, which differs according to the properties of the production func-
tion.
Workers’ desire to make an impact also affects firm’s choice of the amount
of capital it installs. Given the number of workers, the firm’s optimal capital
stock is implicitly described by
pfK(K,L)− r − wKL = 0. (3)
If fLK > 0, then wK < 0, and hence the workers’ desire for impact increases
the firm’s optimal capital stock. A higher capital stock reduces wage cost
as all workers find their job more meaningful. Hence, the return to capital
will be lower than the market interest rate, and the more so in sectors where
capital and labor are more complementary; only when capital and labor are
perfect substitutes does optimal investment have the return to capital equal
6
the market interest rate.7
Our results will continue to hold when the firm has monopoly power in
the product market. Then, even for a given physical marginal product of
labor, the worker’s wage increases with firm’s output: the downward sloping
demand curve means that the value of marginal product declines with output
even if physical marginal product does not decline as the firm expands output.
Hence, if the firm has some monopoly power in the product market, workers’
wage increases with the number of workers hired, even when fLL = 0.
3 Propagation of unemployment shocks
A firm can more easily replace workers the looser the labor market. The lit-
erature on job search commonly assumes that the probability that a vacancy
is filled increases with the unemployment rate (see for instance Pissarides
(2000)). In our model, this implies that φ increases with the economy’s un-
employment rate. An immediate implication is that, all else equal, wages
increase with unemployment:
wφ ≡
∂w
∂φ
= −IφUI
Uw
> 0,
where Iφ = − [pfL(K,L)− q] < 0, as seen from (1). A rise in unemployment
makes it easier for a firm to replace a worker, implying a decline in worker’s
impact. As the job has become less attractive compared to the outside option
of unemployment, the wage must rise. This, in turn, induces the firm to lay
off some workers. Similarly, a shock which reduces demand for the firm’s
product reduces each worker’s value of marginal product for any given level of
employment. As the utility from employment has declined, the wage a person
will demand to accept the job will increase, thereby reducing employment.
Worker’s desire for impact thus supports high wages during recessions, and
may therefore deepen recessions. The opposite holds when the economy
booms.
Clearly, in practice as well as in a more elaborate model, workers may
be willing to accept wage cuts during recessions, for instance when employed
7Stronger substitutability of capital and labor may also reduce in another way a worker’s
impact. When the firm fails to hire a new worker after the current worker vanishes, it may
install additional capital, which increases production more, the closer capital and labor
are substitutes.
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workers earn a rent and a wage cut reduces the probability of job losses.
Then, the impact motive reduces workers’ willingness to accept wage cuts,
and may therefore contribute to wage stickiness.
4 Investment in worker’s skills and hold-up
We saw that if capital is complementary with labor, a firm can reduce the
wage it pays by investing in more capital. Clearly, the same holds for invest-
ment in worker’s firm-specific skills, as such investment directly increases a
worker’s marginal product when working for the firm. The impact motive
may thus alleviate the well-known hold-up problem which may arise when
wages may be renegotiated after the investment has been made. (See Mal-
comson (1997) for a survey of the hold-up literature.)
Consider the following example. A firm employs one worker whose pro-
ductivity is given by R(S), where S is firm’s investment in worker’s firm-
specific skills. The firm’s profits are R(S)−w− S. Hence, for a given wage,
the firm’s optimal investment satisfies RS(S) = 1. That is, the firm invests
up to the point where the last dollar invested yields a return of a dollar. This
level of investment would arise in the absence of both the hold-up problem
and the impact motive.
Suppose that after a firm invested, the firm and the worker can renegotiate
the wage, resulting in the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The firm’s
surplus is:
R(S)− w − φ [R(So)− wo − So] ,
where, as before, φ is the probability of filling a vacancy, So is the investment
in a new employee’s skills, and wo is the wage paid a new employee. Note that
S does not appear as a cost, since it is a sunk cost once the investment has
been made. For convenience, let a worker’s utility be linear in income and
impact, with γ measuring the weight on impact. A worker’s surplus from
working rather than taking the outside option is the difference in income,
w−w, plus γ times the difference in impact. A worker’s impact when working
at the firm equals (1− φ)R(S) + φ [R(S)−R(So) + q]. The only difference
from (1) is that a new worker’s productivity can differ from the current
worker’s productivity, since S need not be equal to So.8 Worker’s impact in
8If the investment in a new worker’s skills So is also considered as output, the current
worker’s impact is φSo higher. Including this does not affect the results, except for the
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the outside option is q, as in Section 2. The worker’s surplus is therefore
w − w + γ {R(S)− φR(So)− (1− φ) q} . (4)
The Nash bargaining solution implies:
w = α {R(S)− φ [R(So)− wo − So]}+ (5)
(1− α) {w − γ [R(S)− φR(So)− (1− φ) q]} ,
where α is the worker’s relative bargaining power. The worker’s wage result-
ing from the bargaining clearly depends on the firm’s investment S:
∂w
∂S
= αRS(S)− (1− α) γRS(S).
As in the standard hold-up model, the wage increases with S, the worker
capturing part of the return on investment; see the first term. For a given So,
however, the worker’s impact also increases with S, resulting in an increase
in the worker’s surplus and, hence, a lower wage; see the second term. If
the impact motive is sufficiently strong compared to a worker’s bargaining
power (that is, if γ > α/(1 − α)), the bargained wage declines with the
firm’s investment. This contrasts to the standard hold-up model without the
impact motive.
The firm anticipates renegotiation of the wage when deciding how much
to invest on the worker. Maximizing profits R(S) − w − S with respect to
investment in worker’s skills S, where the wage w is given by (5), yields
RS(S) =
1
(1− α) (1 + γ) . (6)
As in the standard hold-up model, the worker’s ex post bargaining power
(α > 0) reduces the firm’s optimal investment, because the firm anticipates
that it does not reap the full return on its investment. But the worker’s
desire for impact (γ > 0) increases the firm’s investment: an increase in the
worker’s skills increases the worker’s impact, reducing the wage that results
from bargaining. When γ = α/(1 − α), the two effects cancel and optimal
equilibrium wage in equation (7), which is γSo higher.
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investment satisfies RS(S) = 1. When γ is larger, the firm invests even
more.9
The effect of the impact motive on optimal investment is independent
of the value of φ. So, even when the worker can be replaced immediately
(φ = 1), worker’s desire for impact promotes firm’s investment in worker’s
skills. Inspection of the expression for worker’s surplus (4) shows why. When
the firm increases S, the worker’s impact increases for a given value of So,
independent of the ease with which the worker can be replaced. The higher
impact implies a higher surplus to the worker, resulting in a lower negotiated
wage. Because the firm’s investment in its current worker’s skills does not
affect the profitability of investing in a new worker’s skills were the current
worker to vanish, So is taken as given. In equilibrium, of course, S = So and
w = wo. It follows from (5) that in equilibrium the resulting wage is
w =
1
1− αφ (α [(1− φ)R(S) + φS] + (1− α) {w − γ (1− φ) [R(S)− q]})
As opposed to the firm’s incentives to invest, the equilibrium wage does
depend on φ. The ease with which a worker can be replaced has two effects.
First, a higher φ improves the outside option of the firm, implying a lower
bargained wage. Second, a higher φ reduces a worker’s impact, implying a
higher bargained wage. Only when γ is sufficiently large does the impact
effect dominate.
Consider the extreme cases φ = 0 (a worker is never replaced) and φ = 1
(a worker is immediately replaced). When φ = 0 the equilibrium wage is
w = αR(S) + (1− α) {w − γ [R(S)− q]} ,
which increases with S when γ < α/(1 − α); this is identical to the condi-
tion for RS(S) > 1 we obtained before. When the worker can be replaced
immediately (φ = 1), the equilibrium wage is
w = w +
α
1− αS, (7)
9The high wage returns to private-sector training usually found in empirical studies may
suggest that the impact motive plays only a minor role in investment decisions. However,
a recent study by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2003) shows that a large part of the estimated
returns can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity. Controlling for the selectivity bias
reduces the point estimate of the return to training from 12.5% to 0.6%. Low or zero
returns to company training are also found by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) and several
studies mentioned therein.
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which always increases with S, but is independent of the return on investment
and also independent of the worker’s desire for impact as measured by γ. The
intuition is straightforward. The equilibrium wage increases with equilibrium
investment since, when the worker would leave, the firm hires a new worker
and incurs investment cost S. The current worker captures part of this
quasi-rent. Since a worker can be replaced immediately, his impact is the
same inside and outside the firm, and equals q, as in Section 2. Hence, in
equilibrium, the worker derives no utility from impact, and so impact does
not affect the wage. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the worker’s desire for
impact raises the firm’s investment in worker’s skills, independent of the value
of φ; see (6). Hence, RS(S) may be less than 1, implying high investment
in worker’s skills, even when the worker captures much of the (quasi-)rents
from the firm’s investment. If the firm could commit to investment in future
worker’s skills, it would commit to little investment, aiming to increase the
current worker’s impact and hence reduce the wage it pays the current worker.
5 Effort and incentive pay
We so far assumed that a worker’s effort is exogenously fixed. In this sec-
tion, we relax this assumption and examine the implications of the impact
motive for optimal incentive schemes and worker’s effort. As in the previ-
ous section, we consider a firm which employs a single worker whose utility
is linear in income and impact. For simplicity, let a worker’s cost of effort
be 1
2
θe2. Effort e generates output e, sold at unit price p. To save space,
we abstract from household production (q = 0). As before, we assume that
workers are homogeneous. We distinguish two cases: noncontractible effort
and contractible effort.
5.1 Noncontractible effort
When effort is noncontractible, the firm’s only choice variable is the wage of-
fer. The optimal wage offer is such that the worker’s participation constraint
is just met, as in Section 3. The worker chooses effort. The worker’s impact
is
I(e) = (1− φ) pe+ φ |pe− Epeo| ,
where Eeo is the expected level of effort by the replacement worker. With
probability (1− φ), the worker is not replaced and his impact equals the value
11
of his production. With the remaining probability, the worker is replaced, and
his impact equals the expected absolute difference between his production
and production of the replacing worker. The first-order condition for optimal
effort is:
γ
·
(1− φ) p+ φp pe−Epeo|pe−Epeo|
¸
− θe = 0,
where e 6= Eeo. Note that when φ = 0, optimal effort is e = γθp. Hence,
though the firm does not reward the worker for effort, the worker optimally
chooses positive effort, as it increases his utility from impact. For any φ > 0,
the first-order condition yields two local maxima:
e∗h =
γ
θ
p and e∗l =
γ (1− 2φ)
θ
p.
Suppose first that φ ≤ 1/2, so that both local maxima imply positive effort.
Clearly, we cannot have a unique value of optimal effort. If one of the effort
levels would be strictly optimal for the current worker, it will also be for
the worker who would replace him, reducing a worker’s impact to zero, and
violating the requirement that e 6= Eeo. Instead, workers mix on e∗h and e∗l .
For this, the worker must be indifferent between choosing high effort and low
effort. That is,
w + γ [(1− φ) pe∗h + φ (pe∗h −Epeo)]−
1
2
θe∗2h = (8)
w + γ [(1− φ) pe∗l + φ (Epeo − pe∗l )]−
1
2
θe∗2l .
Let z be the probability with which the replacing worker exerts e∗h. Conse-
quently:
Epeo = (1− z) pe∗l + zpe∗h.
Substituting this and the values of e∗h and e
∗
l into (8) yields
z = 1/2.
Hence, workers mix with equal probability on e∗h and e
∗
l . Similarly, it follows
that when φ > 1/2, and so e∗l must be zero, the worker chooses e
∗
h with
probability
z =
1
4φ
,
and with the remaining probability exerts no effort.
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The wage the firm must offer follows from the worker’s participation con-
straint U ≥ U :
if φ ≤ 1/2 then w = U − 1
2
[1− 2φ (1− φ)] p2γ2
θ
if φ > 1/2 then w = U − 1
4
γ2p2
θ
Clearly, the wage decreases with how much workers care about impact (γ)
and increases with the cost of effort (θ) and the outside option utility (U).
For 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
2
, the wage increases with the replacement probability (φ), as
higher replacement implies less opportunity to make an impact. A higher
price of the product implies greater impact at given effort and so reduces the
wage.
5.2 Contractible effort
When effort is contractible, the firm can avoid inducing workers to mix on
high and low effort by offering a contract that fixes effort. Then, however, a
worker’s utility from impact falls, and so the firm must pay a higher wage.
This section examines this trade-off by comparing expected profits under two
alternative contracts: one that fixes effort and one that offers a piece rate.
Consider first the fixed-effort contract. The firm maximizes profits pe−w
subject to the worker’s participation constraint:
w + γ (1− φ) pe− 1
2
θe2 ≥ U.
Obviously, when the firm offers a fixed-effort contract, the worker’s existence
only affects output if the worker is not replaced, which happens with proba-
bility φ. The profit-maximizing effort level is:
e∗ =
1 + γ (1− φ)
θ
p, (9)
which increases with the weight attached to impact γ and the product’s price
p, and decreases with cost of effort θ and the replacement probability φ. The
resulting profits are
πfe =
1
2θ
[1 + γ (1− φ)]2 p2 − U.
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Consider next a piece-rate contract paying a bonus of αp per unit of
output and a base salary of β. When choosing effort, the worker’s utility is:
U = αpe+ β + γ [(1− φ) pe+ φ |pe−Epeo|]− 1
2
θe2.
The first-order condition for optimal effort yields two local maxima:
e∗h =
α+ γ
θ
p and e∗l =
α+ γ (1− 2φ)
θ
p. (10)
As under noncontractible effort, workers mix with equal probability on e∗h
and e∗l .
10 Expected profits are
Eπpr =
1
2
(1− α) α+ γ
θ
p2 +
1
2
(1− α) α+ γ (1− 2φ)
θ
p2 − β
Maximizing with respect to α and β, subject to the worker’s participation
constraint U = U , yields optimal α = 1. Hence, as in a standard principal-
agent model with risk-neutral agents, the firm pays the full marginal product.
Note that this implies that the expected level of effort is the same under
the piece-rate contract as under the fixed-effort contract. (If α = 1, then
e∗ = 1
2
e∗h +
1
2
e∗l , see (9) and (10)). The resulting expected profits are
Eπpr =
1
θ
½
1
2
(1 + γ)2 − γφ [1 + (1− φ) γ]
¾2
p2 − U.
It is easy to verify that if γ > 0 and φ > 0, then a piece-rate contract always
yields higher expected profits than does a fixed-effort contract (Eπpr > πfe).
Hence, the firm profits from giving the worker some autonomy. The intuition
follows. A fixed-effort contract limits worker’s opportunity to make an impact
since a worker’s successor will exert the same effort as the current worker.
A piece-rate contract leaves effort choice to the worker. The worker mixes
on a high and a low effort level, resulting in the same expected effort level.
Worker’s utility is higher, however, as his expected impact is larger. The firm
can therefore offer a lower wage by not specifying effort, but instead giving
10As we will see, if γ < 1 the restriction that α+ γ (1− 2φ) > 0 for positive e∗l does not
bind. That is, the marginal utility from impact must be smaller than the marginal utility
from consumption, which seems reasonable. If γ > 1, workers mix on exerting effort e∗h
and exerting no effort, as in the previous subsection.
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the worker some autonomy.11 This is in line with the evidence discussed in
the Introduction that workers are willing to accept a lower wage for greater
autonomy. Desire by workers for impact may thus explain why firms leave
employment contracts deliberately incomplete.12
6 Concluding remarks
Our model considered the desire of workers for impact, ignoring the same
desire by managers or entrepreneurs. This motive is a theme in one of the
most popular TV shows in the U.S., ‘The Apprentice.’ In the show, a wealthy
businessman, Donald Trump, fires a worker each week. The pleasure he takes
in saying “You’re fired” is evident. And, in line with our model, he also gets
the pleasure of hiring one person at the end of the show, and he clearly
likes the impact he then has. Trump even enjoys firing high productivity
contestants.
Such an impact motive exhibited by managers may explain several styl-
ized facts. First, employer’s desire for impact may imply a bias towards ex-
panding the firm. This may happen when, with positive probability, the firm
vanishes once the employer vanishes. Second, when the employer is replaced
with positive probability, employers may mix on expanding and contracting
the firm. For by doing so, the employer minimizes the probability that a
successor will behave identically, and hence his existence matters for output.
Employers have more opportunities to make an impact in more rigid labor
markets. The reason is that laying off workers hardly affects the economy’s
output in very flexible labor markets as laid-off workers easily find a new
job. So we may expect more volatile and higher unemployment in more rigid
labor markets.
Another extension of the model would be to allow for heterogeneity in
desire for impact among people. As McClelland (1987, p. 173) notes, “While
all children start out enjoying having impact, some parents may strongly
discourage this activity, so their child does not develop much pleasure from
it or develop a good concept of how to attain pleasure in this way. Other
parents may allow or even encourage the activity, so their child develops
11Note the difference with Aghion and Tirole (1997) where authority is valued by a
worker as it allows him to make his preferred choice.
12See Fehr et al. (2001) for an alternative explanation based on the theory of inequity
aversion.
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a more elaborate schematic representation of the many different ways in
which he or she can get pleasure from having impact.” Allowing for such
heterogeneity may raise interesting issues of sorting by workers and selection
by employers.
We have defined impact as the immediate effect that a person’s existence
has on output. Clearly, there are other, possibly complementary concepts.
In addition to the ‘flow’-approach we have pursued in this paper, one could
think of a person’s ‘stock’ of impact, that is, the effect that his life has had on
output. People may value knowing that the world would be a different place
if they had never been born. Part of our results will also hold under this
definition of impact. Others may not. Lastly, one might revise the definition
of impact to the effect a person has on other people’s lives, rather than on
output.
16
References
[1] Abowd, John M., Francis Kramarz, and David N. Margolis (1999) “High
Wage Workers and High Wage Firms.” Econometrica, 67(2): 251-333.
[2] Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole (1997) “Formal and Real Authority
in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy, 105(1): 1-29.
[3] Benz, Matthias and Bruno S. Frey (2003) “The Value of Autonomy: Ev-
idence from the Self-Employed in 23 Countries.” Institute for Empirical
Research in Economics Working Paper No. 173, University of Zurich.
[4] Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak (2004) “Competition and Incen-
tives with Motivated Agents.” Mimeo, London School of Economics.
[5] Botti, Simona and Sheena S. Iyengar (2004) “The Psychological Pleasure
and Pain of Choosing: When People Prefer Choosing at the Cost of
Subsequent Outcome Satisfaction.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, forthcoming.
[6] Brunello, Giorgio (1995) “The Relationship between Supervision and
Pay: Evidence from the British New Earnings Survey.” Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, 57(3): 309-321.
[7] Card, David and Alan B. Krueger (1994) “Minimum Wages and Em-
ployment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania.” American Economic Review, 84(4): 772-793.
[8] Clark, Andrew E. (1998) “Measures of Job Satisfaction: What Makes
a Good Job? Evidence from OECD Countries.” Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, Labor Market and Social Policy—
Occasional Papers No. 34.
[9] Conger, Jay A. and Rabindra N. Kanungo (1988) “The Empowerment
Process: Integrating Theory and Practice.” Academy of Management
Review, 13(3): 471-482.
[10] de Charms, Richard (1968) Personal Causation: The Internal Effective
Determinants of Behavior. New York: Academic Press.
[11] Deci, Edward L. (1975) Intrinsic Motivation. New York: Plenum Press.
17
[12] Delfgaauw, Josse and Robert Dur (2002) “From Public Monopsony to
Competitive Market: More Efficiency But Higher Prices.” Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper 02/118-1, Amsterdam/Rotterdam.
[13] Fehr, Ernst, Alexander Klein, and Klaus Schmidt (2001) “Fairness, In-
centives and Contractual Incompleteness.” Centre for Economic Policy
Research, Discussion Paper 2790.
[14] Foster, Andrew, Greg Parston, and John Smith (2002) “Making
A Difference: Motivating People to Improve Performance.” London:
HM Treasury, Public Services Productivity Panel, http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/pspp.
[15] Francois, Patrick (2000) “’Public Service Motivation’ as an Argument
for Government Provision.” Journal of Public Economics, 78 (3): 275-
299.
[16] Francois, Patrick (2004) “‘Making a Difference’: Labor Donations in the
Production of Public Goods.” CMPOWorking Paper Series No. 04/093,
University of Bristol.
[17] Frey, Bruno S. and Matthias Benz (2003) “Being Independent is a Great
Thing: Subjective Evaluations of Self-Employment and Hierarchy.” In-
stitute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 135,
University of Zurich.
[18] Frey, Bruno S. and Marcel Kucher (1999) “Managerial Power and Com-
pensation.” Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Pa-
per No. 28, University of Zurich.
[19] Frey, Bruno S., Marcel Kucher, and Alois Stutzer (2001) “Outcome,
Process and Power in Direct Democracy — New Econometric Results.”
Public Choice, 107 (3-4): 271-293.
[20] Glazer, Amihai (2004) “Motivating Devoted Workers.” International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(3): 427-440.
[21] Groshen, Erica L. and Alan B. Krueger (1990) “The Structure of Su-
pervision and Pay in Hospitals.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
43(3): 134S-146S.
18
[22] Hackman, J. Richard and G.R. Oldham (1976) “Motivation through the
Design of Work: Test of a Theory.” Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 16: 250-279.
[23] Handel, Michael J. (2000) “Models of Economic Organization and the
New Inequality in the United States.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Harvard University.
[24] Hellerstein, Judith K. and David Neumark (1999) “Sex, Wages, and
Productivity: An Empirical Analysis of Israeli Firm-level Data.” Inter-
national Economic Review, 40(1): 95-123.
[25] Krueger, Alan B. (1991) “Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Exami-
nation of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 106(1): 75-101.
[26] Leonard, Jonathan S.(1987) “Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and
Turnover.” Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4): S136-S152.
[27] Leuven, Edwin and Hessel Oosterbeek (2003) “An Alternative Approach
to Estimate the Wage Returns to Private-Sector Training.” Mimeo, Uni-
versity of Amsterdam.
[28] Leuven, Edwin and Hessel Oosterbeek (2004) “Evaluating the Effect
of Tax Deductions on Training.” Journal of Labor Economics, 22(2):
461-488.
[29] Levy, David M. (1955) “Oppositional Syndromes and Oppositional Be-
havior” In Paul H. Hoch and Joseph Zubin, eds. Psychopathology of
Childhood. New York: Grune and Stratton.
[30] Light, Paul C. (2002) “The State of the Nonprofit Workforce.” The
Nonprofit Quarterly, Fall: 6-16. (http://www.tsne.org/files/306-37.pdf)
[31] Malcomson, James M. (1997) “Contracts, Hold-up, and Labor Markets.”
Journal of Economic Literature, 35(4): 1916-1957.
[32] McClelland, David C. (1987) Human Motivation. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
19
[33] McClelland, D. C., G. Ross, and V. Patel (1985) “The Effect of an
Academic Examination on Salivary Norepinephrine and Immunoglobu-
lin Levels.” Journal of Human Stress, 11: 52-59.
[34] Nicholson, Sean, Marc V. Pauly, Daniel Polsky, Claire Sharda, and He-
lena Szrek (2004) “Measuring the Effects of Workloss on Productivity
With Team Production.” NBER Working Paper No. 10632.
[35] Perlmutter, Lawrence C. and Richard A. Monty (1977) “The Importance
of Perceived Control: Fact or Fantasy?” American Scientist, 65: 759-
765.
[36] Perry, Phillip M. (2001) “Holding Your Top Talent.” Research Technol-
ogy Management, 44(3): 26-30.
[37] Pissarides, Christopher A. (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory
(Second edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[38] Prendergast, Canice (2003) “The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats.”
Mimeo, University of Chicago.
[39] Schultheiss, Oliver C., Michelle M. Wirth, Cynthia M. Torges, Joyce
S. Pang, Mark A. Villacorta, and Kathryn M. Welsh (2004) “Effects
of Implicit Power Motivation on Men’s and Women’s Implicit learning
and Testosterone Changes after Social Victory or Defeat.” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming.
[40] Smith, Michael, Anthony Masi, and Paula Lemay (1997) “The Deter-
minants of Blue Collar Wage Rates: An Analysis of a Dataset Incorpo-
rating Observed Job Characteristics.” Labour, 11(1): 113-140.
[41] Spreitzer, Gretchen M. and David Doneson (2005) “Musings on the Past
and Future of Employee Empowerment.” In: Tom Cummings, ed. Hand-
book of Organizational Development. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
[42] Thomas, Kenneth W. and Betty A. Velthouse (1990) “Cognitive El-
ements of Empowerment: An “Interpretive” Model of Intrinsic Task
Motivation.” Academy of Management Review, 15(4): 666-681.
[43] Walsh, Frank (1999) “AMultisectorModel of EfficiencyWages.” Journal
of Labor Economics, 17(2): 351-376.
20
[44] Winter, David G. (1973) The Power Motive. New York: Free Press.
[45] Zuckerman, Miron, Joseph Porac, David Lathin, R. Smith and Edward
L. Deci (1978) “On the Importance of Self-Determination for Intrinsi-
cally Motivated Behavior.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
4: 443-446.
21
